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DUE PROCESS PROBLEMS OF PROPERTY
DAMAGE NO-FAULT INSURANCE
Michigan, Florida, and Massachusetts have recently enacted auto-
mobile property damage no-fault legislation.' Similar to the concept
of personal injury no-fault plans, the property damage legislation bars
tort recovery for damage to vehicles involved in collisions and substi-
tutes a system of insurance protection that would compensate the
vehicle's owner for these losses without regard to fault.2 There are,
however, two essential differences between the property damage and
personal injury proposals. First, because property damage claims have
been minor as compared to those for personal injuries, the property
damage proposals have permitted the vehicle owner to self-insure for
the former losses by making his purchase of the no-fault insurance
optionalA Second, as compared to personal injury losses, property
damage can be quickly, accurately, and objectively computed.4 These
two distinctions between property damage and personal injury no-fault
protection have caused the property damage plans to encounter con-
stitutional difficulties which were avoided by the personal injury
legislation.5
Generally, the constitutional attacks against both personal injury
and property damage no-fault plans have been on two distinct grounds.
The fundamental concept of no-fault protection, together with its con-
sequent restrictions on tort recovery, has been challenged under the
due process clause,6 while the equal protection clause has been used to
I FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627, 738 (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34-0 (Supp. 1974);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3121 et seq. (Supp. 1974). Far more states have enacted
personal injury no-fault legislation alone. See Gouldin, Countrywide Overview ofAutomobile
No-Fault Insurance, 23 DEFENSE L.J. 443, 468-69 (1974), for a list of states that have enacted
personal injury no-fault protection plans.
2 Generally the statutes provide that the tort action is not barred if the injured party's loss is
greater than a predetermined "threshold" amount. See note 8 and accompanying text infra.
3 It is not clear whether the courts should distinguish between insurance that is optional
and insurance that is "mandatory" when, in the latter case, there is a proviso that the insured
may elect a deductible so large that he is, in effect, not covered by it. The courts appear to
have made this distinction. See notes 44, 52-54 and accompanying text infra.
I Mehr & Eldred, Should the Automobile Property Damage Liability Insurance System
be Preserved?, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 811, 816-20 (1973). This factor appears to be the reason
why far more states have enacted personal injury no-fault coverage than have enacted
property damage no-fault protection. It was the explicit reason for its omission from the
original Keeton-O'Connell proposals. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR
THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 362-68 (1965). J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY 182-83 (1971).
5 See parts I B and I C infra.
6 Somewhat related to the due process attack have been the arguments that no-fault
legislation denies the plaintiff his right to ajury trial and also restricts his fundamental right to
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attack individual elements of specific legislation. 7 Since all presently
enacted no-fault legislation contains various exceptions and so-called
"threshold" loss determinations above which tort recovery is not re-
stricted, the equal protection attack has had some limited success
against such specific classifications of the personal injury legislation.,
Although the due process attack has not been successful against the
personal injury legislation, it has fared somewhat better against the
property damage no-fault plans.9
I. DUE PROCESS
The due process argument has two elements: first, the no-fault
legislation provides no reasonable substitute for the abrogated
common-law tort remedy; and second, the legislation bears no rational
relationship to a legitimate legislative objective. The issue in the first
element is usually not whether such a reasonable substitute has been
provided, but whether such a substitute is constitutionally required of
the legislation.' ° Although the courts have addressed these two attacks
as separate questions, they appear in practice to be interrelated. That
is, the less the legislation provides as a reasonable substitute for the
abrogated tort remedy, the more rigorous will be the test of legitimate
state purpose. However, to avoid basing a decision on this delicate
balancing determination, whenever possible the courts either have
upheld such legislation by showing that it provides a reasonable sub-
stitute remedy and satisfies the rational relation test, or else have struck
travel. Neither argument has succeeded. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 23-24
(Fla. 1974); Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 600-02, 616, 522 P.2d 1291, 1301-02, 1312
(1974); Opinion of the Justices, -N.H.-, 304 A.2d 881, 887 (1973).
The cases upholding personal injury no-fault plans are: Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296
So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974); Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974); Pinnick v.
Cleary, -Mass.-, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971); Opinion of the Justices, -N.H.-, 304 A.2d 881
(1973). Personal injury no-fault legislation was struck down in Grace v. Howlett, 51 111. 2d
478, 283 N. E.2d 474 (1972). See parts I B and IC infra for a discussion of the property damage
litigation.
8 E.g., in Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 20-21 (Fla. 1974), the court held that
to permit common-law tort recovery for a fracture of a "weight-bearing bone" while barring
such recovery for other fractures was a denial of equal protection. The court upheld the
no-fault statute but struck this particular distinction from it. In Grace v. Howlett, (Ill. Cook
County Cir. Ct. 1971), cited in 1972 INs. L.J. 59, aff'd on other grounds, 51 111. 2d 478, 283
N.E.2d 464 (1972), the circuit court held that it was a denial of equal protection to require a
$500 medical expense loss before tort recovery could be sought for pain and suffering on the
theory that cheaper medical sources were available to the poor and, therefore, their injuries
would have to be more severe in order to reach the $500 threshold amount. The Illinois
Supreme Court based its decision not on these grounds, but on a clause in the Illinois
Constitution providing that no special or local law shall be passed when a general law can be
made applicable. ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 13. This provision resembles a strict equal protection
clause.
9 See parts I B and I C infra.
"0 See part I A infra.
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it down by showing that neither test has been met. Therefore, property
damage no-fault legislation must be examined in the absence of clear
constitutional standards."
Cases testing the constitutionality of legislation abrogating tort
remedies must be distinguished according to whether they are
decided by federal courts examining state laws under the federal
due process clause, state courts examining state laws under either
federal or state due process clauses, 12 or state courts examining
state laws under a state constitutional "right to redress" clause.13 One
reason for this distinction is that federal courts will overturn state
economic regulation only if the legislation "is restrained by some
express prohibition in the Constitution.' 1 4 As a result of this deference
to state legislatures, federal courts have upheld state tort-abrogating
legislation merely on a showing that the statute was within the state
police powers," while at the other extreme, some states with a "right
to redress" clause in their constitution have held that legislation
abrogating a tort remedy will only be upheld on a clear showing of
public necessity.", Where a state court might fall in the continuum
between these two positions is dependent upon the particular state
constitutional clause and the willingness of the state court to re-
examine legislative actions. 17
A. The Reasonable Substitute Test
In New York Central R.R. v. White,18 the Supreme Court upheld
the New York workmen's compensation laws on the ground that they
provided an adequate and reasonable substitute for the abrogated tort
recovery by the employee against his employer.' 9 The Court did not
"See parts I B and I C infra.
12 See note 57 infra.
13 See part I B infra. The effect of a "right to redress" clause is so similar to that of a due
process clause that these clauses may be discussed under the same heading.
14 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963).
One commentator has noted that
[t]he Supreme Court's recent reluctance to declare state laws unconstitutional
under the due-process clause unless basic civil liberties are involved has
important implications for litigation. The result may well be that constitutional
litigation over state laws will be concentrated more and more in state courts
under state constitutional provisions, and state constitutional law may become
of dominant importance.
P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 115-16 (1949).
15 See notes 56 and 71-76 and accompanying text infra.
16 See part I B infra.
17 See note 57 infra.
18 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
19 After finding that a reasonable substitute had been provided, the court examined
whether the legislation bore a rational relation to a permissible legislative objective.
The subject-matter . . . is the matter of compensation for human life or limb
[VOL. 8:646
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express a uniform test for reasonableness but examined fairness of the
arrangement "from the standpoint of natural justice."2 Apparently
the Court felt that the certainty of recovery under workmen's com-
pensation was a reasonable substitute for the denial of a possibly
greater recovery through a common-law tort action. The Court
recognized that it was not necessary to its disposition of the case to
determine whether the due process clause required that a reasonable
substitute remedy be furnished by all such legislation,2 but in spite
of this recognition, the Court implied that it thought a substitute might
be required of all such legislation:
It perhaps may be doubted whether the State could abolish all
rights of action on the one hand, or all defenses, on the other,
without setting up something adequate in their stead.22
However, this decision was written at a time when the Court was
willing to apply its concept of fundamental fairness to state legisla-
tion; 23 it is doubtful that the Court would find the test necessary
today. 4 Nonetheless, the dictum has given the reasonable substitute
test considerable impetus in state courts.2 5
In the first constitutional test of personal injury no-fault legislation,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Pinnick v. Cleary26 held that the
state statute satisfied the reasonable substitute testy.2  The statute
abrogated all tort recovery for injuries resulting in economic loss of
less than $2000.28 It required 29 the owner to purchase no-fault insur-
ance to cover his own economic losses 0 up to the level that the tort
recovery was restricted, but the statute permitted no recovery for pain
lost or disability incurred in the course of hazardous employment, and the
public has a direct interest in this as affecting the common welfare.
243 U.S. at 206.
20 243 U.S. at 202.
21 243 U.S. at 201.
22 Id. It may be difficult to reconcile this dictum with the Court's statement, "No person
has a vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for
his benefit." 243 U.S. at 198. The Court's latter comment has been followed by a "plethora of
authority." Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 599, 522 P.2d 1291, 1301 (1974).
23 See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34.
24 See note 14 supra and notes 71-76 and accompanying text infra.
25 All cases examining the constitutionality of no-fault legislation on due process grounds
have applied this test. See cases listed at note 7 supra.
26 -Mass.-, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971).
27 Although Massachusetts has a constitutional "right to redress" clause, the court held
that it substantially duplicated the federal due process clause. The decision, therefore, was
based on what the court took to be federal due process requirements. 271 N.E.2d at 600.
28 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §§ 34-A, 34-M (Supp. 1973).
2o However, a deductible was permitted that effectively made the coverage optional. See
note 52 and accompanying text infra.
30 Such losses included medical expenses and lost wages. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90,
§ 34-M (Supp. 1973).
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and suffering unless the medical expenses exceeded $500.31 Adopting
reasoning similar to that in New York Central, the court in Pinnick
held that the certainty of recovery by the injured party for his losses
was a reasonable substitute for the possibility of tort recovery for pain
and suffering. 32 As did the Supreme Court in New York Central, the
Massachusetts court specifically noted that it was not deciding whether
failure to meet the reasonable substitute test would invalidate the
legislation. 33
Apart from no-fault litigation, the only recent examination of
whether the reasonable substitute test is constitutionally required has
appeared in a pair of Minnesota cases involving an element of the
state's workmen's compensation laws which abrogated the right of a
third-party tortfeasor to recover contribution from the employer.14
Since the third-party tortfeasor received no benefits from the work-
men's compensation law, the court held that no reasonable substitute
had been offered. Thus, the court was directly faced with the question
of whether the substitute was constitutionally required. In the first
case, Haney v. International Harvester Co.,35 after an examination of
decisions from other jurisdictions involving tort-abrogating legislation,
the court concluded,
The point which emerges is that a common-law right of action
may be abrogated without providing a reasonable substitute if a
permissible legislative objective is pursued. In the cases which
have arisen involving such abrogated rights of action, it has been
determined that the legislative objective has been to prevent
vexatious litigation. 36
Although the constitutional challenge to the legislation in Haney
was under both the federal due process clause and the Minnesota
"right to redress" clause,37 the court made no attempt to distinguish
whether those cases it examined had been decided on federal or state
constitutional grounds. The Haney court reached no final decision; it
3' MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 6-D (1974).
32 The Pinnick court also examined whether the legislation satisfied the rational relation
test. See note 59 and accompanying text infra.
11 271 N.E.2d at 605 n.16. Other courts have not been so careful. See, e.g., Carlson v.
Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W.2d 615 (1974) cited at note 39 infra.
34 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.061(10) (Supp. 1974).
3- 294 Minn. 375, 201 N.W.2d 140 (1972). The statute was not in effect at the time the tort
occurred in this case. Thus, had the court reached a decision, it would have been based on
policy implicit in other Minnesota statutes relating to workmen's compensation.
36 Id. at 385, 201 N.W.2d at 146. Cf. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929). There may be
some question about the accuracy of this determination. See text accompanying note 75
infra. Furthermore, the abrogation of any tort will prevent some vexatious litigation.
31 MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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remanded to the trial court for a full trial, and the case was settled
before reaching the supreme court again."
The Minnesota court again considered the issue in Carlson v.
Smogard.'0 This time the court did not use the results of the examina-
tion of other cases that it conducted in Haney; rather, it stated simply
that the test was twofold-whether a reasonable substitute was offered
and whether the rational relation test was met, citing Pinnick v.
Cleary.4" The Carlson court found that neither test had been met by
the legislation and, therefore, struck down the statute. Thus, while the
dictum in Carlson would require that both tests be salisfied, the courts
holding that neither had been met may imply that legislation must
meet only either of the tests. If so, the rational relation test being
necessarily applicable to any legislation, the holding logically negates
the necessity of the reasonable substitute test. However, statutes
abrogating the third-party remedy have been upheld in other states
whose courts appear to have found some justification for such legisla-
tion." Perhaps the Carlson court was using the failure of the legislation
to meet the reasonable substitute test in order to require a stronger
justification of the statute under the rational relation test. At any rate,
the confusion of the Haney-Carlson opinions is typical of decisions
that fail to distinguish whether the challenge before the court is based
on federal or state grounds and whether the cases cited are based on
similar constitutional provisions and interpretations.
B. The "Right to Redress" Clauses
The first judicial challenge to property damage no-fault legislation
occurred in Kluger v. White.42 The Florida law barred all tort recovery
for property damage incurred by a vehicle if the total of such damage
was less than $550. 41 The law also provided that the purchase of the
no-fault insurance was optional for damage below that amount. 44
Since such "no-fault" property damage insurance had always been
available in the form of collision insurance, the Florida court reasoned
38 Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W.2d 615 (1974).
19 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W.2d 615 (1974).
10 Recall that the Pinnick court made no claim that it was deciding this question. See note
33 supra.
41 The majority of states uphold such legislation. Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 977, 978 (1957).
4' 281 So. 2d I (Fla. 1973).
43 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.738(5) (1974).
44 The term "no-fault insurance" is a slight misnomer. As used here, it is nothing more
than collision insurance. The Massachusetts and Michigan "no-fault property damage insur-
ance" is also optional. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90 § 34-0 (Supp. 1974); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 500.3121 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
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that the only practical effect of the law was to completely abrogate a
tort remedy without offering any substitute. Thus, the Kluger court
had to face the issue of what additional constitutional justification
would be required of legislation that failed to meet the reasonable
substitute test.
45
Florida's constitution has, as do twenty-nine other state constitu-
tions,4" a so-called "right to redress" clause promising that the courts
will be open for every person for redress of any injury.4 7 Some states
having such provisions have held that their "right to redress" clause
guarantees no more than a due process clause would.48 However, in
Kluger, the Florida court held that such a clause would guarantee thai
tort actions, at least those existing at the time of enactment of the
constitution, may not be abrogated by the legislature without sub-
stantial justification. 49 Thus, the Kluger court held, not on the basis of
a due process clause but on the state's "right to redress" clause, that if
the reasonable substitute test were not met, then the burden shifted to
the legislature to show "an overpowering public necessity" which could
not be met by alternate means. The court noted that no such over-
powering necessity had been demonstrated and struck down the
legislation.5°
Although the Kluger decision represented a setback for the property
damage no-fault concept, it could hardly be considered fatal; relatively
few states have interpreted their "right to redress" clauses to incorpo-
rate existing tort actions into the state constitution. Furthermore, the
Florida court's reasoning that optional insurance is no substitute for
the abrogated tort remedy is somewhat questionable. For example,
the court in Pinnick noted that the plaintiff had the option to choose
45A holding that failure to satisfy the reasonable substitute test would itself invalidate the
legislation would have run contra to Florida precedent because the court had previously
upheld the Florida automobile guest statute, McMillan v. Nelson, 149 Fla. 334, 5 So. 2d 867
(1942), and also upheld the abrogation of the action for alienation of affections, Rotwein v.
Gersten, 160 Fla. 736, 36 So. 2d 419 (1948). See note 50 infra.
46 See Comment, "No-Fault" Insurance-Lack of Reasonable Substitute for Eliminated
Cause ofAction for Property Damage Violates State Constitution, 4 MEMPHIS ST. U.L. REV.
635, 639 n.31 (1974).
47 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21, states, "[t]he Courts shall be open to every person for redress
of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."
48 E.g., Pinnick v. Cleary, -Mass.-, 271 N.E.2d 592,611(1971); Manzanares v. Bell, 214
Kan. 589, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974).
49 See also Saylorv. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky. 1973); Lebohm v. City of Galveston,
154 Tex. 192, 199, 275 S.W.2d 951, 954 (1955). See cases collected at 16A C.J.S. Constitu-
tional Law §§ 709e-10 at 1216-19 (1956).
50 The court distinguished the McMillan and Rotwein cases (see note 45 supra) by saying
that in McMillan the legislature had not abolished the guest's right of action in the guest
statutes but merely adjusted the requirements for recovery from negligence to intentional
injury. In Rotwein, the abolition was justified because the overpowering purpose was to
avoid extortion and blackmail. 281 So. 2d at 4.
[VOL. 8:646
Property Damage Insurance
a deductible so large that, in effect, he would not be covered by the
"mandatory" no-fault insurance provided by the law.5 ' Thus, under
the Massachusetts law, personal injury protection was as optional as
the Florida property damage coverage; yet the Pinnick court appeared
not even to consider whether, as the Kluger court later concluded, the
no-fault coverage thereby failed to provide a substitute for the old
tort remedy. 52 A more serious problem with the Kluger court's reason-
ing is that it is difficult to understand why any mandatory system of
insurance might be constitutional while the seemingly lesser imposition
of a system which differs only by being optional is not. 3 Apparently,
the only way to avoid this problem is to suggest that it is the require-
ment to make a choice that is unconstitutional, not the choices
offered."
C. The Rational Relation Test
The second element of the due process attack against no-fault
legislation has been the requirement that the statute bear a rational
relationship to a legitimate legislative objective. Of course, this test is
not unique to tort abrogation legislation, and even decisions that have
found the reasonable substitute test to have been satisfied have none-
theless applied this second test to the legislation.55 Here again, one
must distinguish whether a federal or state court is applying the test.
While the federal courts require only that some "reasonably conceiv-
able state of facts [exist] that relates the regulation to any reasonably
conceivable permissible objective,"5 the state courts appear to vary,
SI Pinnick v. Cleary, -Mass.-, 271 N.E.2d 592, 607(1971). The Pinnick decision actually
utilized the fact that the coverage could be optional to support the constitutionality of the
statute against the plaintiff's claim that he had been deprived of due process by being forced
to insure himself through a private, profit-making corporation. Id. at 607.
" The dissent in Kluger noted this element of the Pinnick holding, 281 So. 2d at 8, but the
majority did not attempt to resolve the two positions.
5 The Kluger decision noted that the issues would be different if the insurance coverage
had been made mandatory. 281 So. 2d at 5. Again, this logical difficulty was noted by the
dissent, 281 So. 2d at 10, but the majority did not respond to the problem.
51 It might be argued that in spite of the existence of accurate statistics, the public is
sufficiently ignorant of probability theory that it should not be forced to decide intelligently
whether to waive its rights to recovery either in tort or on an insurance contract. Further-
more, while the individual may have some knowledge about whether or not his own conduct
is more likely than that of an average person to result in a loss, he is in no position to know
whether he will be an innocent victim of a negligent tort. These arguments have not been
discussed in the cases, however.
5 See, e.g., New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Lasky v. State Farm
Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974); Pinnick v. Cleary, -Mass.-, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971). No
court has yet found that a reasonable substitute was provided by the legislation but that it
nonetheless failed the rational relation test.
-1 Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legisla-
tive Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95, 106. The test is similar to the equal protection test. See
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
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and some will require considerably more justification than the federal
courts will.57
In all cases concerning personal injury no-fault legislation the courts
have held that the rational relationship test has been satisfied.5" These
decisions have found, as the legislatures presumably found, that the
common-law tort recoveries for personal injuries in automobile
accidents were cumbersome and slow, riddled with inequities and
excessive litigation expenses, and a drain on judicial resources. 59
Recall, however, that property damage loss differs from personal
injury loss in that the loss can generally be quickly, accurately, and
objectively determined."0 Thus, the difficulties in the determination of
damages that cause the protracted personal injury litigation are not
present in property damage cases.6' In the initial test of Michigan's no-
faulty property damage legislation,6 2 the Wayne County Circuit Court
in Shavers v. Kelley,13 found that none of the above justifications for
personal injury no-fault plans exists in support of property damage
legislation. After hearing extensive testimony, the court struck down
the Michigan no-fault property damage provisions, finding that
[i]n short, the clear evidence was that the tort property damage
indemnification system was working efficiently, and that there
was no social objective to be served by abrogating tort rights of
owners of property damaged by negligent tort feasors. 64
Indeed, precisely such a conclusion prompted the early advocates of
no-fault to exclude property damage from their proposals.65
The Shavers decision followed the Kluger reasoning that because
the property damage coverage was merely optional, it offered nothing
to the public that did not already exist under the prior system, and,
therefore, the statute abrogated a tort remedy without furnishing any
-17Although the federal courts no longer use so-called substantive due process to justify
examining state economic regulation from a natural justice standpoint (see notes 14 and 23
supra) many state courts continue to use this approach. Hetherington, State Economic
Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law (pts. 1-2), 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 13, 226(1958);
Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91
(1950).
58 See note 55 supra.
5' Pinnick v. Cleary, -Mass.-, 271 N.E.2d 592, 602-05 (1971). These are precisely the
shortcomings of tort recovery noted by early no-fault advocates. R. KEETON & J. O'CON-
NELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 11-34 (1965).
60 See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
61 Mehr & Eldred, Should the Automobile Property Damage Liability Insurance System
be Preserved?, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 811 (1973).
62 MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 500.3121 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
63 Civil No. 73-248-068-cz [CCH Auto. Ins. Cas. [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] 8308]
(Mich., Wayne County Cir. Ct. May 20, 1974). An appeal is pending at this writing.
64 Civil No. 73-248-068-cz at 59.
11 See note 4 supra.
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substitute. Although Michigan does not have a "right to redress"
clause, the court said that the state and federal due process clauses
require that
[s]uch abrogation of tort remedies without substitute remedy can-
not stand ... unless there be found some interest in society to be
served... and unless the means selected to eliminate that evil are
reasonable and appropriate. 66
The court's decision was based not on whether the means selected were
reasonable but on the failure of the legislation to serve a societal
interest.67
Thus, the Shavers decision may have more impact on the future of
no-fault legislation than the Kluger case. First, Kluger was based on a
peculiar clause of the Florida. constitution, while Shavers rested on
the pervasive due process clause. Secondly, the factual determination
by the Shavers court that the legislation served no societal interest may
bear on the rational relation test without regard to whether a reason-
able substitute has been offered. 68 Thus, by following the Shavers rea-
soning that no social purpose is served by the legislation, a court might
avoid the logical difficulties involved in determining that no reasonable
substitute had been offered. 69
II. DUE PROCESS: FUTURE POSSIBILITIES
Even if subsequent courts agree with the Shavers determination that
tort recovery for property damage is working fairly and efficiently,
property damage no-fault plans may yet be upheld on any of three
grounds. First, a court may determine as a matter of judicial policy
that the legislature was legitimately acting within its police powers
(i.e., authority to regulate to promote the health, safety, and welfare
of the public) and that, as long as the legislation related to these
powers, the wisdom of the legislation would not concern the courts.
Second, a court might hold that the legislation would be reasonable if
the legislature had found that the property damage recovery under the
tort system was as plagued with difficulties as the personal injury
66 Civil No. 73-248-068-cz at 57. The Michigan law also required vehicle operators to carry
property protection insurance which would cause the insurer to be liable without regard to
fault for up to $1,000,000 for all damage to property other than another operated vehicle.
MiCH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3101, 500.3121 (Supp. 1974). The court held, alternately,
that this violated equal protection. Civil No. 73-248-068-cz at 60-61.
67 Shavers v. Kelley, Civil No. 73-248-068-cz at 60.
66 Recall that the Kluger decision stated that, had the insurance been mandatory, the
question would be different. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
69 See notes 51-54 and accompanying text supra.
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recovery system and that-also as a matter of judicial policy-it is not
the function of a court to review such legislative determinations. Third,
there exist lesser justifications for no-fault property damage legislation
which the Shaver decision did not mention, holding, apparently, that
such justifications, even if found to exist, were not sufficient to balance
the abrogation of the tort remedy.70 Other courts may balance these
factors differently.
For example, in Silver v. Silver,71 the Supreme Court upheld the
"automobile guest statutes" on both the first and second of the above
grounds. Generally, these guest statutes provide that the driver of an
automobile is not liable to a gratuitous guest for the guest's injuries
caused by the driver's simple negligence. The justifications for these
statutes appear to be to avoid collusion between the driver and guest
to recover from the driver's insurer and to prevent the gratuitous guest
from being so ungracious as to demand that his host exercise ordinary
care not to injure him.1 - The Court dismissed the argument that due
process was violated:
Whether there has been a serious increase in the evils of
vexatious litigation in this class of cases . . . is for legislative
determination and, if found, may well be the basis of legislative
action further restricting the liability. Its wisdom is not the con-
cern of the courts.73
The Court thus required no additional justification because of the
abrogation of the guest's tort remedy, nor did it mention the dictum in
the New York Central case that it was apparently overruling.74 The
Court clearly was not willing to reexamine the legislative determina-
tion that the statute tended to reduce vexatious litigation. But this does
not imply that the Supreme Court agreed-as the Haney court under-
stood it to have done7 5-with the legislature's determination. In fact,
the language of the decision seems to grant to the legislature great
leeway in determining a legitimate basis for such legislation; avoidance
of vexatious litigation is only one such possible basis. This deference
70 See text accompanying note 80 infra.
71 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
72 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 187 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser seriously questions the
social policy of these laws. Id. at 187.
13 280 U.S. at 123.
" See note 22 and accompanying text supra. In fact, it is not clear that vexatious litigation
has been reduced by the guest statutes:
There is perhaps no other group of statutes which have filled the courts with
appeals on so many knotty little problems involving petty and otherwise
entirely inconsequential points of law.
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 187 (4th ed. 1971).
-' See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
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to state legislatures in their economic regulation is characteristic of the
Supreme Court, however, and the Silver decision should be weighed
in that context. 6
Thus, state. courts that are willing to defer in areas of economic
regulation to state legislatures acting either legitimately within their
police powers or as bodies determining fact as a basis for policy may
uphold property damage no-fault legislation. However, state courts
have generally not been so willing to defer to state legislative wisdom
in the latter's exercise of police powers77 or the fact finding function. 78
For example, several state courts have recently declared automobile
guest statutes to be unconstitutional. 79
Courts may yet uphold property damage no-fault legislation by
finding other social policies to which such legislation is reasonably re-
lated. For social policy justifications of the property damage statute,
the Shavers decision looked on!y to factors that had been cited as
justification of personal injury no-fault legislation.8" Other justifica-
tions for property damage coverage may exist. For example, in states
with personal injury no-fault plans, it may be administratively wasteful
to maintain dual recovery systems for personal injury and property
damage claims. As another possible justification, the legislature may
determine that the overall social cost of expensive-to-repair cars
should be borne by those placing such cars on the highway. Thus, the
decision that the owners of such cars should bear the burden of pur-
chasing insurance to cover damage to these cars may be a legitimate
social policy determination by the legislature. Finally, in abrogating
any tort remedy, there are at least minimal savings in judicial resources.
Any of these reasons may qualify as legitimate legislative objectives,
and some courts may find them sufficient justification to counter-
balance the abrogation of the injured party's tort recovery for
property damage.
16 See notes 14 and 56 and accompanying text supra.
77 See note 57 supra.
78 The Michigan Supreme Court, for example, has admitted evidence that public health
was not in fact promoted by a law banning the bottling of milk in gallon containers. The law
was then held unconstitutional because it lacked a rational relationship to its suggested
purpose. Grocers Dairy Co. v. Department of Agriculture, 377 Mich. 71, 138 N.W.2d 767
(1966). Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
9 See Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855,506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388(1973); Thompson v.
Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362
(1974); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974). But see Justice v. Gatchell,
-Del.-, 325 A.2d 97 (1974); Duerst v. Limbocker, -Ore.-, 525 P.2d 99 (1974). Although
these decisions are based on equal protection grounds, the Silver decision also held that the
classifications were rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose and thus the guest
statutes did not violate the federal equal protection clause. Thus, these state courts do not
feel as restrained as the federal courts in examining such legislation.
80 Personal injury no-fault was upheld in Shavers because it was an attempt to reduce the
tort recovery problems discussed at note 60 and accompanying text supra.
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III. CONCLUSION
It appears that in balancing the possible failure of legislation to
offer a reasonable substitute remedy with the social policy to be pro-
moted by such legislation four key factors will affect the judicial
determination of constitutionality: (1) whether the challenge is based
on federal or state constitutional grounds; (2) if on state grounds, what
the provisions of the particular state constitution are; (3) whether the
challenge is in state or federal court; and (4) if in state court, the
extent to which the court is willing to re-examine legislative actions.
Whether a state court will follow the federal courts' policy that failure
to provide a reasonable substitute will merely give standing to a plain-
tiff to question the rational relationship of the legislation to a proper
legislative objective, or whether the courts will follow the Florida
decision that failure to provide such a substitute will place the burden
on the legislature to show an overpowering social interest to be served
will depend upon the individual state constitutional provisions and
the state's traditional orientation toward judicial review.
-Stephen L. Jones
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